



T he story of Simone Weil's life has been told often enough andneed not be sketched once more on this occasion. For the
present purpose, however, it might be noted that, though brilliantly
successful as a student of the Ecole Normale Superieure, Simone WeiI
would never feel comfortable with her chosen profession as a philos-
ophy teacher, and even less with the illusory prerogatives of the vita
contemp/ativa, generally associated with the status of intellectuals.
Priesthood, whether it be academic, political or religious, was not a
path she would follow. She was, in Susan Sontag's apt words, too
"excruciatingly identical with her ideas" to do SO,I and would forever
remain a mystic without a church, a political activist without a party, a
wandering Jew with a Christian faith, in disagreement with the very
fact of her physical being: "when I am in any place, I disturb the
silence of heaven and earth by my breathing and the beating of my
heart".2 "Renunciation" is a key word in Simone Weil's lexicon: "we
have to be nothing in order to be in our right place in the whole",' she
writes, "Perfection is impersonal" and again, "our personality is the
part of us which belongs to error and sin".4 This is why moral
improvement, here understood as an increase of our sense of reality,
cannot be achieved through acts of will, but on the contrary. through
the negative effort of a greater attentiveness to things.
From a psychological perspective it would be easy enough to trace
the pathological origin of such a fierce renunciation, but it would also
be mostly pointless. If Simone Weil saw in "uprootedness" an origin to
all social and spiritual ma/heur/ it is certainly because she experienced
that condition within herself; but more importantly, her being
nowhere at home coincided with an inability to distance herself from
her own thoughts which bears witness, in her own body, to a
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fundamental aspect of the human condition. Her deliberate exposure
to an unconditional truth, without the mediation of intelligence,
informs her meditation on the subject of ,attention'; and her advice to
those who wish to learn (on whose side she places herself) is one of
intellectual detachment: '~ttention consists of suspending our
thought, leaving it detached, empty and ready to be penetrated by the
object". It is necessary to wait, humbly and as long as it takes, for the
object to become, not visible, but a self-evident realisation of pres-
ence, the imageless expression of a revealed reality. Clearly "attention"
here is synonymous with contemplation and not merely a psycholog-
ical faculty or the realisation of an intention of seeing something.
Rather it is, for Simone Weil, the expression of a spiritual obedience:
If we suspend the filling-up activity of the imagination
and fix our attention on the relationship of things,
a necessity becomes apparent which we cannot help
obeying. Until then we have no notion of necessity and
we have no sense of obedience.6
To bear spiritual fruit, the mind ought to remain in a state of suspen-
sion essential to contemplation. It has to wait silently, neither shaken
nor displaced by any shock from without for the revelation of what is
necessary. In French, (lttente (wait) and attention (attention) share the
same etymolohry: both words refer to a tension towards an object that is
yet to become manifest. But patience and the deliberate receptivity of
mind involved in the process of making oneself available to a felt pres-
ence should not be confused with the clean slate dear to the empiricist,
let alone the suggestion that the mind should resemble a wax tablet
upon which the considered object would of itself imprint its mark.
Attention to a thing can be informed by a specific knowledge, but only
on the condition that it remains uncluttered by it. Too often, haste in
seizing the first thought that presents itself with relation to an object-
generally the knowledge we already have of it-blocks the thinking
process: "the cause is always that we have wanted to be too active, [for]
there are some kinds of effort which defeat their own object".? Such
remarks could remind one of Fenelon's own brand ofquietisme: "do not
deafen God with your prayers", the bishop of Cambray would preach,
"be quiet and God will speak to you". But it also seems reminiscent of
Kant's 'disinterested interest' or 'finality without end' that characterises
the Judgement of Taste. Be that as it may, it is as a religious philosopher
that Simone WeiI thought of "the attitude of looking and waiting [as]
the attitude which corresponds to the Beautiful".~
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From yet another perspective, the distinction drawn by Simone
Weil between the different modalities of attention conjures up "the
floating listening" (/'icoute jlottante) recommended by Lacan to the
practitioners of psychoanalysis, in order to connect with an unsaid
within the said. But it is from a mystical perspective quite foreign to
Freud, Lacan, or Kant, that Simone Weil taught that, in order to hear
what can only be half-said and is generally beyond the grasp of the
conscious mind, one needs to be neither indifferent nor over-attentive.
Most often, attention is confused with a kind of muscular effort.
If one says to one's pupils: "Now you must pay attention", one sees
them contracting their brows, holding their breath, stiffening their
muscles. If, after two minutes, they are asked what they have been
paying attention to, they cannot reply. They have been concentrating
on nothing. They have not been paying attention. They have been
contracting their muscles.')
Still, "attention" is an effort, the greatest of all perhaps, but a
negative one, which of itself does nor involve tiredness. The main
obstacle is not the accumulation of fatigue, and the difficulty is not
to fix our attention with the intensity that curiosity or desire would
command: "we do not obtain the most precious gifts by going in
search of them, but by waiting for them". Grace is the appropriate
name for the process described here, and one is not surprised to see
Simone Weil replicating the Augustinian distrust in curiositas, as the
original sin perverting the very principle of human attention.
Curiositas or more exactly concupiscentia ocu/orum, was interpreted by
the bishop of Hippo as a desire to have as many experiences as
possible. It suggests an intellectual Don Juanism and implies an
incapacity ever to be satisfied, a restlessness of the mind that is
wholly incompatible with prayer or faith. Furthermore, there is a
vanity inherent in curiositas, a hollowness at the core of the intellec-
tual search that seeks to establish knowledge as a sufficient end for
itself. Under the mantle of cunositas, there lies a vain desire to feel
and see what lies beyond whilst neglecting the only knowledge that
genuinely matters: "I desire to know God and the Soul. Nothing
more? Nothing at all" (St Augustine). Finally, eoncupiscentia oeu/orum is
a temptatio because it always desires to renew the experience of
gaining new knowledge and, in supporting this desire, curiositas is to
be understood with reference to one of the most generic scenes in
the history of Christian ethics. When Adam and Eve violate the
divine command by eating a fruit from the tree of knowledge, they
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yield to the Great Tempter who has instilled in them a desire to
know and in his commentary of the episode (de Civitate Dei, XIV),
St Augustine defines malice or evil as the product of an avid
curiosity. Here again, Simone Weil concurs:
Something in our soul has a far more violent repugnance
for true attention than the flesh has for bodily fatigue.
This something is more closely connected with evil than
is the flesh. That is why every time that we really concen-
trate our attention, we destroy the evil in ourselves. 10
Again, there is a similarity of thought between the author of this
passage and the Father of the Church who viewed concupiscentia carnis
as being less damaging for the soul than intellectual libido. If carnal
desire can be satisfied through the experience of voluptas, curiositas
remains insatiable and is even more avid in its own desiring than the
animal senses beyond which it aims and which it professes to despise.
Intellectual curiosity does not permit a genuine connection with the
object it seeks to grasp, because in it, thought, knowledge and adhe-
sion are not united in a single act of mind. Once again, God alone is
truly worthy of our attention: He alone, and nothing else. However,
this does not mean that everything else is illusion. It means that
Simone Weil envisages reality and value through God alone. This is
why "all the various kinds of attention are merely degraded forms of
religious attention. It is only when we think of God that we can
think with the maximum of attention".11
Leaving aside the theological origins of a philosophy of attention
whose final object is the love of God, Simone Weil's thoughts on the
subject of education act as a startling reminder of the debasement of
a system forsaking its social/spiritual role by letting itself be
redefined by economic 'rationalism' and other heteronomous forces.
Her moral teaching and the testimony of her brief existence may
have become profoundly strange to US,I~ yet it constitutes a point of
reference that makes it piercingly plain that it is not with semantic
games or linguistic plays of the deconstructive kind that it will ever
be possible to defeat the insignificance into which contemporary
culture has fallen: 13
Extreme attention is what constitutes the creative faculty
in man and the only extreme attention is religious. The
amount of creative genius in any period is strictly in pro-
portion to the amount of extreme attention, and thus of
authentic religion, at that period.l~
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We mayor may not agree with the diagnosis that creativity is but the
manifestation of a religious attention, or that the inattentive
attention quite literally produced by the industrial production of
appearances and the format of the mass-media concords with the
spiritual nullity of our cultural environment, but it would be more
difficult altogether to dismiss the view that the production of
forgetting by the Culture Industry amounts to a derealisation of our
material circumstances which attention alone might oppose.
For Simone Weil, the essential purpose of education consists in a
reawakening or a re-orientation of the soul which ultimately
transforms knowledge into a providential dispensation. As Father
Jean-Marie Perrins puts it, perhaps the Jansenism of her belief and
her vacillation between "a pessimism which reduces man to nothing-
ness and an optimism which raises him prematurely to divinity"'~ is
so remote from the narcissism typical of the post-modern condition
as to have become incomprehensibly excessive. Yet her approach to
the problem of learning allows for a better grasp of the systemic
character of the teacher's predicament, or the difficulty of capturing
the attention of those to whom we address ourselves for a sufficient
length of time. To teach the inattentive has become our impossible
task, and this to the point where, Weil contends, "... the develop-
ment of the faculty of attention forms the real object and almost the
sole interest of studies. Most school tasks have a certain intrinsic
interest as well, but such an interest is secondar)," Oriented towards
God (the meaning of meaning), attention as prayer begins with a
hope to transcend the indifference of a purely speculative curiosity.
But such a hope is the first casualty of a system that reduces all utter-
ances into the undifferentiated flow of 'communication'. In the vast
network of complicities and tacit acceptance of the world as it is
described by the mass media, it seems possible only to maintain an
inattentive attention, even if one episodically feels the indignity of a
chronic ataraxia.
Television, of course, illustrates a situation one no longer dares to
deplore, where the simple fact of appearing coincides with the
disintegration of significance: the event or the idea ceases to exist as
soon as it has appeared and has been replaced by another, whose sole
raison d'hre is to ensure the regularity of visual distraction. Television
requires a contraction of the intelligence usually defined in terms of
attention span. A few years ago, ten minutes or so was the maximum
capacity of this sporadic kind of attention, then it was five, then one,
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and now, I am told, it oscillates between ten and thirty seconds. In
that sense it is true to say that the mass media 'educate' their
audience, that is to say, systematically erode their capacity for
attention. "We live in a world of unreality and dream", Simone WeiI
thought, and it is the task of the artist, the scholar and the
philosopher to:
pierce through the film of unreality that veils it, and make
of it, for nearly all men, at nearly every moment of their
lives, a dream or stage set. They ought to do it, but more
often than not they cannot manage it. '6
The reasons for such an impotence are manifold indeed, but it
may be worth remembering Hannah Arendt's realisation that
"the subject of the totalitarian realm is neither the fanatic nazi, nor
the devout communist, but the person for whom the distinction
between fact and fiction (i.e. the reality of experience), and the
distinction between the true and the false (i.e. the norms of thinking)
no longer exist". J7 It is the person who, for one reason or the other,
has become unable to feel within himself, the reality of the world, or,
to put it in Kantian terms, has lost his capacity for judgement. Such a
person is therefore ready to accept just about any view of the world,
any received idea concerning reality, especially if it provides an outlet
for previously unmanaged anxieties. In fact, the originality of
Arendt's analysis (and her affinity with Simone Weil's), lies precisely
in the fact she would not regard the totalitarian ideology as an
intellectual corpus (a Weltanschauung), but as a mentality or a funda-
mental manner of'thinking', defined by a near complete indifference
to the ideas it professes. Such an opportunism is inseparable from its
radical contempt for the reality of the world and the concrete
existence of those who live in it. If we dig a little deeper into Arendt's
analyses of this particular indifference, we may find the link between
the totalitarian mentality and 'the specific mentality of the moderns',
a particular aspect of German Romanticism or the belief that the
freedom to experiment is necessary for the search for a lost origin
(whether of language or of being). The purpose of this activity,
however, does not long remain a search for lost meaning, and soon
the real business of the artist or the intellectual consists in surprising
his audience with daring paradoxes and risky views that ultimately
celebrate arbitrariness itself. The more arbitrary a work seems, the
more original it is viewed.
Again, what matters to Arendt here is that the dogmatic constraint
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of the totalitarian mentality and the idiosyncratic genius of the
modern artist/intellectual, represent in fact a similar emancipation
from contingent constraints and formal limits, founded, at least
initially, in the respect for truth and beauty. Both the modern artist
and the fascist militant demonstrate a similar irresponsibility in the
use of ideas that are no longer considered as heuristic tools, but as
alibis to be exploited by the intellect in a pure assertion of its
boundless power. Hannah Arendt goes even one step further, as she
argues that the romantic vision consists in evoking worldly events
after having cancelled their realit)\ to discuss them from the very
perspective of this negation. More important than the real is the thrill
of discovery, the expression of a precious little difference which is
inevitably insignificant.
This indifference to reality characteristic of intellectual culture
forms the negative background of Simone Weil's passionate
attentiveness to the alterity of things and her devoted attendance to
their otherness. The self-referential obsession of a thinking which
cares about nothing but its own trOllvaHles (findings), or the narcis-
sistic obsession of the intellectual/artist in the interpretation of
reality, typifies a certain kind of excitement that allows this endless
process of re-creation. Some may find this continuous swapping of
ideas and opinions 'interesting', but it is most certainly unconcerned
with the reality of rna/beur.
In the moral relativism of both the modern artist, and the mass
man produced by the soft totalitarianism of a media-bound society,
can be fathomed a similarity between different attitudes of the mind,
from which both attention and obedience are missing. It is the same
refusal to accept that human thought has to obey a legality or an
authority which transcends it and which forbids it to do whatever it
fancies with the ideas it plays with. This is why it matters to be
attentive, beyond the seduction of words, to the relationship
between them, or the connection with the world which they inti-
mate. This does not merely mean that to mistreat ideas is the sign
that one is ready to mistreat other people, but rather that contempt
for ideas or the indifference to what ideas actually mean is in itself
already a contempt for others.
The love of our neighbour in all its fullness simply means heing
able to say to him: "What are you going through?" It is a recognition
that the sufferer exists, not only as a unit in a collection, or a spec-
imen in the social category labelled "unfortunate", but as a man
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exactly like us, who was one day stamped with a special mark by
affliction. For this reason it is enough, but it is indispensable, to
know how to look at him in a certain way. The way of looking is first
of all attentive. The soul empties itself of all its contents in order to
receive into itself the being it is looking at, just as he or she is, in all
its truth: "Only he who is capable of attention can do this".
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